The U.S. economy has increasingly integrated with the world economy, with effects on prices, employment, wages, and job security. Does the increasing economic globalization of the U.S. influence policy mood and voter sentiment? Previous research has shown that voters enjoy the benefits of economic globalization but demand compensation for the risks associated with openness. We hypothesize therefore that voters adopt a "compensatory" model, whereby higher levels of exports lead voters to a rightward shift in policy preferences and higher levels of imports lead voters to a leftward shift. We expect that increased international financial liabilities (assets) lead to a leftward (rightward) shift in preferences. We use The U.S. economy has changed markedly in the past few decades. Of particular interest to this paper, the U.S economy is vastly more integrated into the world economy in terms of flows of goods, services and finance, with resulting effects on prices, employment, wages, and job security.
This paper asks, how has the increasing economic integration of the U.S. economy influenced udes, particularly Mood? This paper joins findings and theory from two largely separate literatures: analyses of aggregate U.S. public opinion with studies of economic globalization and policy outcomes. We review the literature on the internationalization of the U.S. economy. We propose that economic globalization variables influence policy mood, and do so in a manner consistent with, as termed in international political economy research, the compensation hypothesis. In the following section, we review existing explanations of Mood. A replication and extension of Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) presents a puzzle: the statistically significant relationship of inflation and unemployment with Mood that characterizes the first half of the period studied disappears in the second half of the period.
It is this puzzle that helps motivate the paper. We discuss why economic globalization affects policy mood and the mechanism through which this occurs. We then present the data and methods in the following section. To test the hypotheses, we use Error Correction (EC) models. To the base models, which build on models from Durr (1993) , Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) , Stevenson (2001) and Wlezien (1995) , we add various indicators of international trade and financial integration. We employ robustness checks to see whether the effects we find for international variables are proxies for changes in inequality or technological advances. We also find robust support for our argument that international trade and financial variables are key determinants of Mood.
T he Internationalization of the U.S. E conomy
The United States economy is increasingly open to trade. As evidence, note that imports plus exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP has risen from 11% in 1977 to roughly 29% in 2010 (BEA 2011) . The U.S. is nearly completely open to international financial flows: the 4 stock of U.S. international financial assets and financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP have risen from roughly 33% to more than 275% for the most recent available date (BEA 2011; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007) .
Within these flows is evidence of deterioration in the relative world position of the U.S.
economy. The U.S. has gone from a net exporter to a net importer and from a net creditor to a net debtor. The trade deficit averaged -4.5% of GDP for the decade of the 2000s; and the net change in the U.S. international financial position for 2000 to 2008 averaged -17% of GDP per year.
The supposition of this paper is that both the magnitude and the direction of the flows of trade and capital will influence the U.S. policy mood. To explain why this relationship exists, we begin by reviewing the evidence regarding the effects on exports and imports on the U.S. economy.
Trade flows are primarily generated through firm behavior. Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2003) show that firms that export are correlated with superior economic performance on many dimensions compared to firms that do not: higher employment, sales, wages, productivity, and investment. A particularly important finding they report production from non-exporters to exports accounts for 20% of U.S. productivity growth in manufacturing. (See also Melitz 2003.) Conversely, firms in import competing industries that do not participate in export trade, compared to firms that do, have slower employment growth, pay lower wages, are far more likely to fail, and far are more likely to switch industries. (See Bernard et al. 2007 .) The exceptions to increasing firm mortality and morbidity in import-competing industries are those firms that have themselves reallocated production abroad, and are importing back into the U.S. These intrafirm unted for between 45 and 48% of the value of all U.S. goods imports since the early 1990s. (Census Bureau 2006 , 2010 In import competing sectors, increasing imports has been associated with U.S. job losses.
Given the behavior of U.S. firms, higher levels of exports translate into employment and wages gains, higher productivity, and higher domestic investment. Given the competition facing U.S. firms in many industries, higher levels of imports in import competing sectors are associated with lower domestic wages, employment, and investment, plus higher risks of firm failure.
The trade imbalances in the U.S. economy have to be offset on U.S. balance sheets by increases in U.S. international financial liabilities. (See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006, 8-12 , for a discussion.) These liabilities are rights held by non-residents to a future income stream from a liabilities, foreign direct investment (FDI) liabilities, and debt liabilities its citizens and governments owe to non-residents.
These financial liabilities, however, translate into diminished current and future U.S. consumption as the U.S. repays the obligations. Large international financial imbalances imply diminished growth and employment prospects in the U.S. High levels of international financial liabilities also lessen the ability of a nation and its citizens to endure shocks. ssets, FDI assets, and debt assets non-residents owe its citizens and government. Higher levels of assets are claims to future consumption, and enhance the ability of a nation, its firms, and its citizens to endure shocks. These are a rights held by residents to a future income stream from foreign assets. Recent scholarship has shown that capital exports by residents of rich countries to other R&D productive countries enhance . (See, e.g., van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg 2001).
Higher levels of international financial assets translate into increased corporate profits, higher longer run domestic growth rates, and increased long-run consumption for domestic residents. Higher levels of international financial liabilities translate into long-run consumption for non-residents and into a diminished ability of the U.S. to insulate itself from shocks.
Given the effects of economic integration on the economy, we now consider how indi suggests a relationship between domestic policy outcomes, such as welfare spending and tax rates, and economic globalization. (See, e.g., Swank 2006.) Although analysis of policy mood has generally been centered in American politics, insights from the IPE literature have important implications for models of policy mood, especially as trade and financial flows become increasingly salient to the American public. In this section, we review existing survey evidence about voter attitudes toward openness to trade and investment.
Paradoxically, even as the U.S. economy has become increasingly integrated with the world economy, the American public expresses limited enthusiasm for economic globalization. Survey respondents express minimal support for free trade per se, unless free trade is accompanied by 1 In looking to the Government to address problems of free trade, respondents are concerned with workers losing jobs from trade because respondents generally believe that free trade hurts job security, and that imports cost more 1 Four surveys asking identical questions were undertaken in 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006 14, 9, 22, and 36% of the respondents in 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006, respectively. Respondents who favored free trade without worker assistance were 18, 16, 13, and 15% of the 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006 samples, respectively. 7 jobs than exports create (CCFR 2007; CCFR 2004; Kull 2004 Scheve and Slaughter (2001) .
These examples demonstrate the potential link between globalization and aggregate policy
preferences. Yet, analysis that examines how indicators of economic globalization affect aggregate measures of U.S. public opinion remains conspicuously absent. Existing work on aggregate policy mood does not take into consideration or theorize the ways in which changes in the exposure of the U.S. to the global economy affect domestic public opinion
H ypotheses
Given the depth of scholarship showing that voter demands for social protection vis-à-vis trade increase with trade exposure, our expectation is that increased imports will bring forth a leftward shift in aggregate policy mood, which would be for greater government involvement. As imports rise and domestic jobs are threatened, we expect voter demands for increased government assistance, which translate into a leftward shift in Mood. With rising exports, however, the demand for social protection would likely diminish, thus translating into a rightward or conservative shift in
Mood. This leads to the first of our hypotheses:
H1a. Increasing levels of imports will lead to a leftward shift in Mood.
H1b. Increasing levels of exports will lead to a rightward shift in Mood. H2a. Increasing levels of international financial liabilities will lead to a leftward shift in Mood.
H2b. Increasing levels of international financial assets will lead to a rightward shit in Mood.
Prior Studies of the Determinants of Mood
We build on a large body of work that examines the determinants of policy mood. Previous models of Mood can be roughly grouped into those that emphasize economic conditions and those that focus on previous policies. Foremost in the first group is work that has focused on the effect of more objective measures of the state of the economy on Mood. Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) found that higher rates of unemployment bring forth a liberal policy mood shift, while increases in consumer price indices bring forth a conservative shift. In other words, the public prefers more government spending when unemployment is high and less government spending when inflation is high. Durr (1993) suggested that prospective economic expectations influenced policy mood.
Durr argued that:
shifts in domestic policy sentiment along a liberal-conservative continuum may be understood in part as responses to changing economic expectations. Specifically, expectations of a strong economy result in greater support for liberal domestic policies, whereas anticipation of declining economic conditions pushes the national policy mood to the right. Their findings suggest that an increase in inequality leads to a conservative shift in the opinion of the American public.
An alternative explanation for shifts in Mood, proposed first by Wlezien (1995) , suggests that periods of lower levels of government intervention, and rightward after period of higher levels of government intervention. Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) also found that an indicator of of a thermostatic reaction to government policies. Higher levels of government involvement produce a conservative shift, and lower levels of government activities produce a liberal shift.
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An interesting puzzle about the changing nature of the US economy and its relationship with
Mood presents itself when we replicate and extend the results of Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) . As an illustrative experiment about how these changes in the U.S. economy might influence
Mood, consider the results of an OLS model of the determinants of Mood, 1956 Mood, -1996 from Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 223, Table 6 .4) presented in Table 1 . The data are described in more detail below.
[ Table 1 about here]
As in their original model, we confirm that increases in the consumer price index (negatively) and in the current rate of unemployment (positively) statistically significantly influence Mood, 1956-96.
In Model 2, when we extend the data to 2008, we find that while inflation and unemployment again This suggests that the effects of inflation and unemployment are concentrated in the earlier period, and that other factors play an increasingly important role in determining Mood. We propose that international economic integration is the main candidate.
Data and Methods
In this section, we introduce the data and methods used to test the hypotheses. Although our argument generalizes to other countries, we test it in the context of the United States from 1956-2008. We use an error correction model to account for the time series nature of our data, and also discuss analysis of unit root characteristics.
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The dependent variable is policy mood, measured using d. 4 The sources of the data are described in Appendix B.
Prior studies of the determinants of Mood will inform the base models in this paper.
Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) A standard estimation approach to time-series modeling in the presence of possible unit roots are Error Correction (EC) models, as used in Durr (1993) and Kelly and Enns (2010) . Error correction methods are increasingly common in economics and political science in time series models where unit roots are suspected. The core assumption of EC models is that the dependent variable responds to short-term changes in independent variables, as well as exhibiting an equilibrium relationship with the longer-term levels of the independent variables. For potentially non-stationary variables that could have a cointegrated relationship with Mood, we enter the lagged levels (the long-run variables) and the contemporaneous changes (the shock variables). For stationary series, we use the variables themselves.
The base Error Correction model (1) for the trade variables is:
Mood t = ß 0 + ß 1 (Mood t-1 ) + ß 2 (Imports t-1 ) +ß 3 (Exports t-1 ) + ß 4 (Economic Growth t-1 ) + ß 5 ( Consumer Price Index t-1 ) + + ß 7 (Social Expenditures t-1 ) + ß 8 ( Imports t ) + ß 9 ( Exports t ) + ß 10 ( Social Expenditures t ) + ß 11 ( Unemployment t )
To this base Error Correction model, we add the international finance variables, which are available over a shorter period: 1970-2007 .
Results
We begin with an examination of the correlations in the data through use of factor analysis.
Factor analysis identifies underlying components or factors that explain the pattern of correlations in a data set. (See Kim and Mueller 1978.) Once the number of components or factors is established, factor analysis allows us to identify which variables in a data set are correlated with which factors, and how strongly.
The table in Appendix A reports the results of our unweighted factor analysis: correlations above the standard thresholds of .5 or higher and -.5 and lower are reported. Four well-identified underlying variables or factors account for 88% of the identifying variance in the data. Mood is the sole member of a factor accounting for roughly 10% of the variance.
Most of the indicators of international economic and financial openness load positively on the first factor, which accounts for 42% of the variance. The only other variable to load on the first factor is social expenditures in levels. Social expenditures are positively correlated with increasing international economic integration, which is consistent with the compensation hypothesis.
The second factor contains 22% of the variance. Change in employment and change in social expenditures load inversely with changes in imports and economic growth. Rising unemployment and increasing imports are part of a single factor. The third factor contains changes in exports and imports, and well as inflation, and accounts for 14% of the variance.
The main lessons from the factor analysis are that Mood is a unique factor in the analysis and that international economic variables contain much of the identifying variance in the analysis.
The international economic variables are not part of a common factor with the domestic economic variables, but bring unique variance to the investigation.
We next present the results of the tests of our hypotheses. We first discuss the results examining the effects of trade. We then add data on financial assets and liabilities, before performing robustness tests. The results are presented in Table 2 . One of the motivations of an EC model is that the dependent variable, Mood, is in an equilibrium relationship with (at least some) independent variables. For those variables that are in an equilibrium relationship with mood, a shift in one of these variables causes Mood to shift as well, at an adjustment rate equal to 1-ß 1 . We briefly summarize the results of Models 1 through 5, before discussing the results of our preferred specification in Model 6.
In Compared to the results presented in Table 1 , inflation continues to have a negative effect on Mood. Unemployment no longer has a statistically significant coefficient. Neither of the coefficient estimates for changes or levels of social spending has a significant effect on Mood. Note, however, that change in unemployment, change in social expenditures, and economic growth are highly intercorrelated variables loading on the second factor.
In Model 2, we add trade balance (measured as exports minus imports as a percent of GDP)
as the first test of our argument. We find that trade balance has a negative and significant effect on This provides initial support for Hypothesis 1. We again find that inflation and economic growth have negative and significant effects on Mood. Interestingly, social spending now has a negative significant effect on Mood, which provides support for the argument that Mood responds thermostatically to the existing policy environment (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stevenson 2001 ). This result is robust across further specifications of the model; social spending is negative and significant in three of four remaining models. We expect that social spending also plays another role; not only is it a proxy for prior policy, but also a mechanism of compensation. In other words, it is plausible that as social spending increases, the public feels more secure, and thus demands less compensation, i.e. a conservative shift in Mood.
In Model 3, we test hypotheses 1a and 1b more explicitly by including separate measures of imports and exports, as specified in Equation 1. Looking first at imports, we see that imports have a positive and significant effect Mood, which supports Hypothesis 1a. Exports are significant at the 85 percent level, as is the contemporaneous effect of imports; however, the estimated coefficient for change in exports is not statistically significant. At this point, it is important to note that there is a high degree of correlation among many of these variables, as evidenced by the factor analysis.
Turning to Hypotheses 2a and 2b: in Model 4 of the direction of the bias in coefficients and standard errors is unknown; thus it is necessary to explore the underlying error structure. Accordingly, Model 6, which takes into account this structure, is our preferred specification.
Model 6 is estimated using autoregressive least squares (RALS). Diagnostics reveal that there is up
to fourth order correlation in the error terms. 7 In this model, Mood adjusts to disequilibria at a rate of 53.5 percent each period. As hypothesized, levels of exports have a negative and significant effect on Mood, while imports have a positively significant effect on Mood. In total, a one-unit increase in the level of exports shifts Mood to the right 3.071 points 3 /(1-1 )), while the largest portion of this change, a rightward shift of 1.643 points, is realized in the next year. The shock to exports is not significant, so the effect of a change in the level of exports is not realized until the next period. Turning to imports, a one unit increase in imports leads to shifts Mood to the left by 1.018 points in the next period; the total effect is a 1.902 leftward shift. These findings support Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The effects of imports and exports on Mood are substantively important.
Turning to financial globalization, we find also support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Liabilities In summary, the core results broadly confirm the long-standing view that policy mood is influenced by economic outcomes. What is new is the finding that increasing globalization of the U.S. economy influences Mood. International economic variables imports, exports, international financial assets, and international financial liabilities influence Mood in a manner consistent with also influences Mood in a manner consistent with the compensation hypothesis.
Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our findings to several alternative hypotheses.
We add additional variables to our base models reported in Table 2 . Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 contain the full models, including the trade and international financial variables. Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 omit the international financial variables while including the trade variables. The omission of the international finance variables gains both degrees of freedom and adds more observations. First, we examine whether inequality, as proposed by Kelly and Enns (2010) , is driving changes in Mood such that the international economic variables proxy for changes in inequality.
Kelly and Enns (2010) argue that increases in inequality will lead to a conservative shift in Mood. A traditional Heckscher-Ohlin factor model, however, suggests the opposite relationship. Openness to trade in an economy benefits those factors that are comparatively abundant. In the U.S., globalization has benefited capital and skilled labor at the expense of less-skilled labor, contributing 20 to rising economic inequality. If this were true, we would expect to find a positive relationship between inequality and Mood. The results are presented in Models 1 and 2 of Table 3 . Although not robust, we find that changes in inequality, measured using the Gini coefficient, have a contemporaneous effect on Mood in Model 1, in the direction predicted by Kelly and Enns. An increase in inequality produces a rightward shift in Mood. 8 International economic variables have estimated coefficients roughly similar to the models in Table 2 . Imports in levels and changes in liabilities have statistically significant and positive coefficient estimates.
[ Table 3 about here]
We also examine the robustness of our results while controlling for the effects technology as manifested through increasing returns to a skill premium. Acemoglu and Autor (2010, p. 8) construct an indicator over time of the premium paid to college-educated workers compared to which technological advances allow for work that is easily codified to be done by machine (at home or abroad), driving down the wages paid to unskilled (or codifiable) work. The intuition is that skill-biased technological changes, manifested as skill premiums, could confound our international trade and finance results. The skill premium variables do not enter the models with statistically significant effects. Again, we find support for argument that international economic variables affect
Mood in a manner consistent with the compensation hypothesis.
We next examine the possibility that the apparent influences of international economic openness are instead those of technological change per se. There is vigorous academic debate over whether technological change or trade is more responsible for increased inequality. The greater factor productivity is one prominent way. It is important to control for this, because even in a closed economy, some of the shifts we attribute to international forces would take place through technological innovation. To test this, we include a measure of multifactor productivity (MFP) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Models 5 and 6. Change in MFP is negative and significant in in model 5. An increase in MFP leads to an immediate conservative shift in Mood. This is not surprising since increasing MFP is often associated with economic growth, which also has a negative effect on Mood. As above, the effects of our variables of interest remain robust to the inclusion of this variable.
In models 7 and 8, we add the GINI, skills premium, and multifactor productivity variables.
Despite extensive information overlap among the variables, the coefficient estimate for change in liabilities is statistically significant and positive. The estimated coefficient for the levels import term is statistically significant and positive in both models 7 and 8; the export term is negative, statistically significant, and substantively large in model 8, which includes a longer time and more degrees of freedom.
We note the economic growth has a robustly significant negative relationship with Mood in the models in Table 3 . As economic conditions improve, voter sentiment moves in a more conservative direction. As economic conditions deteriorate, voter sentiment moves in more liberal direction. This supports the compensation model, rather than the budget model.
of economic expectations to our models in Table 2 Table 2 , and each of the terms is statistically significant beyond the .01 level. The trade coefficient estimates are in every case larger than those in Table 2 . The trade results are robust to the inclusion of the economic expectations terms.
Conclusions
The theory and findings presented here have important implications for the relationship between voter sentiment and globalization. We ask if, and how, the policy mood of U.S. voters responds to the changing nature of the economy and its integration into the world economy.
The evidence strongly shows that Mood responds to economic globalization in a manner the international political economy literature.
In other words, voters prefer higher levels of government involvement in the face of deterioration in the U.S. position. Rising imports and international financial liabilities move Mood leftward; rising exports and international financial assets move Mood rightward. We tested our theory using an error correction model. While we cannot be too confident about the precision of the coefficient estimates in all models, the evidence is that the net effect of economic globalization and the declining relative position of the U.S. in the world economy has been to move voter sentiment and Mood leftward, increasing liberal sentiment.
This analysis provides an important link, not only between separate literatures in American politics and international political economy, but also studies of individual preferences and those of domestic policy outcomes. One area of future research is to examine whether these shifts in policy mood, in conjunction with increasing economic integration, are reflected in domestic spending outcomes. Another area is to explore whether a similar relationship can be found between policy mood and international economic outcomes in other developed democracies. 1956-1996 1956-2008 1956-1982 1983-2008 Mood1 1956-08 1956-2008 1956-2008 1971-2007 1971-2007 1975-2007 1971-2007 1972-2008 1975-2007 1964-2007 1971-2007 1956-2008 1971-2007 1968- 
